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Recent estimates have shown that since
the eighteenth century, more than 550
million United States citizens have lived
and .died. 1 This is in sharp contrast with
the mere 215 million Americans currently
Iiving. 2 Such a drastically uneven ratio is
not a recent phenomenon. The dead have
long been an overwhelming majority
within the United States population.
Despite this numerical superiority,
however, "mortuo-Americans" 3 are
perhaps the most oppressed of all of the
nation's many special interest groups.
Since the ratification of the United
States Constitution, no deceased in·
dividual has ever held any local, state or
federal office. 4 Unemployment among the
ranks of the dead hovers near an
astronomical 100%5 Additionally, the
decedents of both this country and the
world as a whole have traditionally been
denied participation in even the most
basic human societal customs. With the
exception of an occasional Aztec sacrifice,
in which the victim and the god are
"wed," nowhere in recorded history is
there any evidence of deceased persons
being accorded the right to iegally marry.6
Within the Jewish religion, males who die
in childhood have been summarily excluded from the moving ceremony of

1 A totally fallacious figure.
21d.
3 It is well settled in- every federal circuit except the
fifth and every state except Louisiana that "mortuoAmericans" is the accepted non-pejorative term by
which deceased individuals are to be designated.
Hoover. Landon, Willkie & Dewey, Inc. v.
Roosevelt, 502 U.S. 326 (1974). But see Kilpatrick
v. Alexander, 557 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hamilton v. Burr, 307 La. 791, 258 So.2d 18
(1974).
4 Well, do you know of any?
5 U.s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept of Labor, Bull,
No. 432, Unemployment Among Mortuo-Americans
15 (1975).
5 And believe you me, I've looked.

manhood known as "Bar Mitzvah."7 According to French-born metaphysicist,
Raoul P. Auessonne, the discriminatory
attitude which allows such inequitable
treatment is reflected most harshly in the
law of wills which he labels "a vivid expression of the provincial, paternalistiC
manner in which the living view the
dead." Mr. Auessonne asserts that "wills
are merely a way of telling the dead:
'Y ou' d best be sure you arranged your
post-death affairs while you were alive
because we, the living, don't credit you
with the requisite competence to do so
after you've passed on.' Consider the
countless probate suits which have consumed months and even years trying to
determine the testator's intent as evidenced by his will. No one, however, has
78 Torah 457 (B.C., 502).

ever considered the logical solution: Ask
the testator!"8
The courts have been slow to recognize
the inequities inherent in such a societal
structure. A handful of recent events
points to the possibility of some
enlightened reform, however. Grim v.
Reaper,9 considered by many to be the
Plessy v. Ferguson 10 of decedents' rights,
has been attacked in numerous suits as
"the shackles and chains of the deceased
community."ll In Grim, the plaintiff, a
construction worker who had been dead
for fifteen years, sought employment as a

Auessonne, I Am Joe's Corpse, 87 Readers' Digest
68 (Oct. 1973).
9525 U.S. 714 (1975).
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11 E.g., Montague v. Capulet, 502 F.Supp. 593 (D Ga.
1977) (Tybalt, J. dissenting).
8

OCTOBER, 1977

[§]

bricklayer with the Reaper Building Company. It appeared from the facts that the
defendant company rejected Mr. Grim's
application for employment solely on the
basis of the plaintiff's death. 12 The Court,
holding. in favor of the defendant, established the "gone but not forgotten"
doctrine l 3- which was to stand unscathed
through many subsequent sui'ts.14 The
holding enumerated the duties the living
owe the dead, notably excluding employment opportunities, and stated, in pertinent part: "[T]hroughout history, the
dead have been remembered with the
time-honored traditions of lavish funerals,
family photographs, and bits of
memoribilia stored in attics. and trunks.
To disturb this practice now would be to
shatter customs that stretch back over
millennia. Death and life are two distinct
states of being. Would it not have been
patently absurd for the ancient Egyptians
to have constructed vast pyramids honoring living pharoahs? Is it not then equally
absurd to grant the dead employment and
other trappings of the living?"15
The Grim holding met with much disapproval in legal,16 politicaP7 and
academic 18 circles. Notable among the
criticism was an article published in
"Netherweek" and posthumously coauthored by Grover Cleveland and Grover
Cleveland, the 22nd and 24th Presidents
of the United States. According to the
Clevelands, "[e]xpensive funerals and
glowing eulogies are merely techniques
used by the living to assuage the guilt
they rightfully feel for denying the dead
even the simplest elements of human dignity. For too long we have suffered under
the yolk [sic] of presumed incompetence
and have, as a result, been denied everything from employment opportunities to
Grim v. Reaper, 525 U.S. 714, 718 (1975).
131d. at 729.
14 See Your Dentist v. Twice-a-Year, 529 U.S. 125
(1976); cf. Ali v. Frazier, 561 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.
1976); followed slavishly, Clingons v. Enterprise,
562 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1976); held up to public
ridicule, Ricardo v. Mertz, 562 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir.
1976); unhealthilY looked upon as a father figure,
Allen v. Keaton, 494 F.supp, 62 (D. Md. 1976).
15 Grim v. Reaper, 525 U.s. 714,729-730 n.6 (1975).
16 Cleaver V. Haskell, 295 Md. 561, 680 A.2d 927
(1977); Rogers v. Hammerstein, 294 Md. 447, 667
A.2d 929 (1976).
17
110 Cong. Rec. 3234 (1976) (remarks of Senators
Chase and Sanborn).
18 e.e. cummings, Words in Flight Not Blue, 723 (2d.
ed. 1976): "A good decision not said I, then diedmostquickly."
12
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drivers' licenses. We are capable of mak-

ing valuable contributions to society and
should be given the chance to prove it."19
Portions of the Clevelands' article were
quoted extensively before the court in
Scarlett v, Rhett,20 generally agreed 21 to
be the first chip in the granite-like facade
of the rule in Grim, The Scarlett decision,
unlike Grim, dealt not with employment
opportunities, but rather, voting rights.
The Scarlett plaintiff brought a class action suit, representing the deceased residents of Houston, Texas against the director of the local Board of Election Supervisors, demanding the right to register as
voters. The court's decision, in favor of
the plaintiffs, apparently turned upon the
fact that the votes of the deceased had
long been cast, without incident, in
Chicago, Illinois by the late Mayor
Richard Daley and in Texas by the late
former Senator Lyndon "Landslide"
Johnson. 22 Counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that this was not always done with
the consent of the deceased, but asserted
that "the fact remains that without the
deceased vote close elections like the
1960· Presidential balloting might well
have turned out differently. The potential

Cleveland and Cleveland, Decedents' Rights:
Shouting "Fire" in a Crowded Cemetery? 244
Netherweek 34, 37 (1976).
20 528 U.s. 807 (1976).
21 E.g.
General Douglas MacArthur ("I agree.");
General Omar Bradley ("So do I. "); General Robert
E. Lee ("Hey, me too. ").
22 T. White, The Making of the President, 160, 401
19

(1961).

impact of the dead bloc should not,
therefore, be minimized."23
The decision in Scarlett did not,
however, represent an unqualified victory
for the deceased. The court refused to
strike down a Texas law which ruled, in
essence, that any deceased indviduals
who were granted the right to vote, either
by judicial decree or special state permisSion, would be required to pass a current
affairs test similar to the discriminatory
literacy tests of the past. 24 The court
justified this holding with the assertion
that "some of these potential voters have
been dead for over 200 years. We don't
want anyone walking into the voting
booth looking for referenda on prohibition
or the League of Nations."25 Hence, while
permitting decedent suffrage, the Scarlett
court nevertheless clung to the belief that
the burden of proving civic competence
rested on the dead themselves.
Not surprisingly, decedents' rights
organizations quickly raised very harsh
objections to this aspect of Scarlett. In
Simon v. Garfunkel,26 a decision which
followed Scarlett in its entirety, the militant group "Corpses Are People Too"
(hereinafter C,A.P.T.) filed a brief, amicus
curaie, in which it applauded Scarlett's
grant of decedent suffrage but argued that
the requirement of current affairs tests

23

24

25
26

Scarlett v. Rhett, 528 U.s. 807, 812 (1976); see
Unnecessarily lengthy reply brief of Appellant at 8.
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. title 24-14 sec. 9 (Vernon).
Scarlett v. Rhett, 528 U.S. 807, 814 (1976).
534 U.s. 377 (1977).

was based upon a contradiction of logic.
The brief stated persuasively that
franchising the deceased vote should be
viewed as an "implied acceptance" of
civic awareness and thus, render exams
superfluous. 27 Despite the court's rejection of this argument, it was repeated,
with minimal success, in a number of later
cases. 2B
To the dismay of the nation's decedents, the majority of the cases following
in the wake of Simon, Grim and Scarlett
showed no significant advances in the two
major battlegrounds of equality; employment and suffrage. To be sure, some
minor victories were achieved which
helped advance the cause of the deceased.
Notable among these were Astaire v.
Rogers,29 a Minnesota suffrage case which
limited current affairs tests to persons
who had been dead.for 100 years or more,
and Nixon v. Quadrennial Convention of
Deceased Former Presidents,30 a well
publicized dispute which broadened considerably the legal definition of "death."
The Nixon case involved a decision by the
Q.C.D.F.P. to refuse admittance to exChief Executive Richard M. Nixon due to
the fact that the disgraced leader was still
legally alive. Mr. Nixon challenged the interpretation of a convention by-law which
states: "Membership will be open to all
individuals who have held the office of
President of the United States and are
deceased by the time of the convention's
opening session."31 President Nixon
argued that due to his "widely conceded
moral death"32 he should be permitted to
attend the function. The court, ruling in
favor of his argument, held that: "the
ability to make moral distinctions, particularly those involving right and wrong, is
so intimately bound up with what we
know to be the 'human soul,' that when
such ability vanishes it would be patently
illogical to declare the individual alive

Id. at 388.
See. e.g., Simple v. Simon, 568 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.
1977). Questioned Metta v. Pieman, 572 F.2d 641
(2d Cir. 1978); scorned Kowalski v. DuBois, 509
F.Supp. 302 (M.D. N.C. 1978); heartlessly ignored,
Shelley v. Keats, 510 F.Supp. 146 (ND. Cal.
1978); grew up with but no longer speaks to for
reasons which are frankly none of your business
Jordache v. Falconetti, 508 F.Supp 1297 (D.D.C.
1978).
"344 Minn. 227, 402 NW. 342 (1977).
30 540 U.s. 490 (1977).
31 Q.C.D.F.P. By-laws, sec. 17-B26 (19721.
12 Shockingly Maudlin Plaintiff's Brief at 9.
27

due merely to the continuation of all
biological life functions."33 Hence, the net
result of the Nixon case was to help swell
the ranks of the loyal dead with persons
who would otherwise have been partisan
members of the living. As one might expect, numerous cases followed in the
wake of Nixon which interpreted the
holding to include various other deathdefining traits. 34
In spite of the above victories, however,
the dead still lack the sought after, all-encompassing coup so crucial to equality
between the here and the hereafter.
Progress on such wholesale reform finally
began on April 5, 1977 when the United
States Congress approved the proposed
Hereafter Rights Amendment (H.R.A) and
sent it to the various state legislatures for
ratification. 35
The H.R.A, as approved by Congress, is
a very general, broad-based constitutional
amendment, guaranteeing to the deceased
all of the rights, privileges and immunities
now accorded the nation's living citizens.
Modeled after the anti-sex discrimination

33

28

34

35

Nixon v. Quadrennial Convention of Deceased
Former Presidents, 540 U.S. 490, 507 (1978).
E.g., Roark v. Keating, 543 U.S. 227 (1978) (held
that an individual who believes that television personality Tom Snyder is a witty, probing media journalist is suffiCiently incapable of moral judgment to
be declared legally deceased within the meaning of
the Nixon case); accord, Marx v. Hegel, 572 F.2d
67 (3rd Cir. 1978) (held that several individuals
who lived in Camden, New Jersey for ten or more
years without complaint were, for fairly obvious
reasons, morally dead).
Hereafter Rights Amendment (if approved to
become U.S. Canst. amend. XXVIII).

Equal Rights Amendment,36 the H.R.A.
states, in pertinent part: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of death."37 Although no
state legislatures have yet approved or
disapproved of the amendment, it appears
that an uphill struggle is at hand. A recent
Trot polpB indicated that only eleven of
the nation's 50 state legislatures predict a
"strong likelihood" that the H.R.A. will
be approved by their state. Fourteen
states labeled the amendment's approval
"highly unlikely." The remaining 25
states called the question "a toss-up."
Three quarters of the states (38) must approve the amendment in order for it to
become a part of the United States Constitution.39
It appears that the major argument
against the H.R.A. is economic in nature.
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), reknowned economist and decedent,
testified recently before the House Decedents' Affairs Sub-Committee and argued
persuasively that the American economy
is not prepared to handle the "locust-like
descent of hundreds of millions of
unemployed decedents."40 According to
36

.17

38
34

40

Equal Rights Amendment (if approved, to become
U.s. Canst. Amend. XXVIII.
.
See note 35 supra, sec. 1.
N.Y. Times, May 21,1977, sec. 3, at 1. col. ~.
U.S. Canst. art. 5.
Proposed Hereafter Rights Amendment to the
United States Constitution: Heorings on H.R. 1001
Before the Sub-comm. on Decedents' affairs of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Congo 2d.
Sess. 48-52 (1975-76) (statement of Thomas
Malthus, decedent).
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Mr. Malthus, "[nlot only are the jobs
simply not available in sufficient quantity,
but those that are seem to go beyond the
technical capability of the dead. How do
you train countless hordes of people who
lived in the steam age the intricacies of
nuclear physics?"41 Proponents of the
H.R.A. counter this argument with the
results of a Colorado statute,42 passed in
1970, which essentially served the same
purpose as the proposed constitutional
amendment. Far from the entomological
nightmare predicted by Mr. Malthus, Colorado's dead have trickled slowly into
various fields of employment at a rate of
less than one percent of the state-wide
work force annually.43 This, according to
Colorado's Secretary of Labor, Harrison
G. Portsmouth, "is more than slowly
enough for us to accommodate. Additionally, with the commensurately
broadened tax base, the presence of these
new, eager workers has actually stimulated the state's economy."44 The backers
of the H.R.A. assert that this pattern can
be repeated on a national level.
The primary reason for such a slow influx of decedents into the Colorado labor
force appears not to be discriminatory hiring practice, but rather, the fact that few
of the state's dead have elected to exercise their new found freedoms. In 1976,
Colorado officials revealed that barely
five percent of the deceased population

Id. at 5l.
Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 18-401 (1976l.
43 Colo. Bur. of Employment, Stats., Dept of Employ.
BUll. 4, Mortua-Americans 3.
44 Id. at 2.

had even submitted employment applications since the controversial statute was
passed. 45 Not surprisingly, this fact has
been pointed to many times by opponents
of the H.R.A. as indicative of the alleged
superfluousness of the amendment. The
better, and more palatable answer to
these statistics was voiced by Peter L.
Rowan, a regional coordinator of C.A.P.T.
Mr. Rowan, a decedent since 1965,
asserted that, "the question is not one of
how many decedents will elect to exercise
their deserved freedoms, but rather, the
moral obligation of the living to provide
these rights in the first place. Do people
lose their right to vote simply because
they choose not to exercise it? Of course
not. "46
It appears that discussions over the
H.R.A, as with any other highly controversial and emotional issue, will continue to be infused with analogy and
rhetoric of the above nature. Whatever
the outcome, it would be advisable for
both supporters and detractors of the
amendment to bear in mind that the
welfare of over half a billion decedents
lies in the balance. In weighing the
wisdom of the amendment, the 50 state
legislatures are assuming the task of balanCing the potential problems inherent in
a society suddenly swollen many times its
present size, against the importance of extending the guarantees of the United
States Constitution to all Americans, dead
or alive.

CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding decedents' rights, like many other questions of
law and morality, was slow to germinate
but quick to blossom. Case law and public
sentiment appear to be turning slowly
towards a greater consideration of the
needs of the dead. This may be due, more
than anything else, to the fact that unlike
other oppressed people, the dead will
eventually absorb all of us into their
ranks. Thus, supporters of equal rights actions may well be acting exclUSively out
of enlightened self interest. Regardless of
motivations, however, H.R.A. proponents
should be gratified indeed that an issue
which only a short time ago was ignored,
or even mocked, is today being considered for mention in the Constitution of
the United States. Granted, the H.R.A., if
passed, will likely result in a torrent of
confusing litigation, complex holdings
and general turmoil. However, considering America's historically discriminatory
treatment of the dead, a broad constitutional mandate of this nature appears to
be the only definitive manner by which to
ensure both the uniformity and integrity
of the granting of freedoms so sorely lacking today.

41

42

Colo. Bur. of Employment Stats., Dept of Employ.
Bull. 6 Mortuo·Americans 8.
46 Rowan, The Deceased in SOCiety; Equal Rights or
What?, 9 Netherweek 7, 8 (1977).
45
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